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ABSTRACT
Title of Research paper:

Study on Safety Escort of LNG Carriers in Port
Water Area

Degree:

MSc

In this research paper, the properties of LNG and the specialties of LNG carrier are
firstly introduced. Then, the data of 170 LNG carrier accidents collected from 1964
to 2017 are analyzed, and the conclusion of most accidents happened in port is
drawn.

Simultaneously, the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is carried out to analyze the
navigational risks of LNG carriers and to prove the conclusion. Furthermore, it is
concluded that the risk of collision between LNG carriers and merchant ships is a
medium risk and should be controlled. It is decided to reduce the probability of
collision by establishing a Moving Safety Zone around LNG carriers, and to mitigate
the severity of consequences of the accident by setting the Leakage Hazard Zone,
and to protect the two zones by means of tugs or boast escort.

Through the studies on the theory of Ship Domain and the empirical coefficient, the
mathematical model of Moving Safety Zone is introduced, by which the scope of
Moving Safety Zone can be quantitatively calculated and obtained. On the other hand,
the pool fire experimental results of Sandia National Labs are used to classify 3
categories of Leaking Hazard Zones of LNG carrier. Finally, the general standards,
requirements, plans and supports for tugs or boats escort are recommended to
enhance the practicality of this paper.
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KEY WORDS: LNG carrier, port water area, safety escort, accident data analysis,
Formal Safety Assessment, Moving Safety Zone, Leaking Hazard Zone.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background

LNG, as an efficient and clean energy, has drawn great attentions of most countries
around the world. The LNG shipping industry also flourished with the energy
demand, environmental protection requirements, technological upgrading and
regional inequalities of resource distribution. From the first LNG commercial
shipments in 1964 (CH • IV international [CH • IV], 2014, p.3), to the end of 2016,
the number of LNG fleets has increased to 478 carriers, and the total transport
volume has reached 69,300,000 m3 , covering the world's major energy consuming
countries and regions (The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers
[GIIGNL], 2017, p.12). However, as a way of energy transport, the hazards and
potential risks of LNG carriers facing are more serious than other ships. Although
there has not been a record of a total loss of ship or a death of crewmember in the
course of LNG shipping history (CH • IV, 2014, p.3), the accidents caused by the
inadvertent storage and transport of LNG on land are harrowing. In 1944, a LNG
tank damage occurred in the United States Cleveland and the LNG vapor ignited and
exploded, killing 128 people and 225 injured (CH • IV, 2014, p.6). In 1973, an
explosion happened in the process of LNG tank maintenance in Staten Island, the
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United States, which resulted in 40 lives instantly disappear (CH • IV, 2014, p.9).
These painful accidents have always reminded us, to this energy beast, we must
always maintain awe. In the chain of LNG mining, refining, transportation, storage
and use, even a tiny negligence is not allowed. Especially for the LNG shipment, the
crew and carriers face with a more critical environment, the safety requirements and
standards should be more rigorous.
1.2

Objective

The author of this paper is a 10 years experienced port VTS officer, who has an
insightful understanding to the traffic safety and risk management of LNG carrier. In
order to perfect his own work and provide referable experiences, the author
extensively studied all aspects of the LNG shipping industry chain, and found that
the current studies on LNG carriers safety mainly focus on the LNG carrier
construction, LNG cargo storage, port loading and unloading operations and safety
management, etc., yet the navigational safety of LNG carriers during in port were
considered less. As a result, the author finally chose the topic “Study on Safety
Escort of LNG Carriers in Port Water Area” as the research direction. For the
high-risk cargo transportation, although there is a good safety record before, the risks
of LNG shipment would not disappear before unloading from ships. Any negligence
may lead to a chain reaction and eventually lead to disaster. Especially in the port
water area, the navigable waters are limited, the hydrological and meteorological
conditions are complicated, the densely populated areas are nearby, and the
ecological environment is fragile. In addition, in recent years, the number and
volume of LNG carriers have increased significantly; the navigational safety of LNG
carriers in port has become a very sensitive and cannot be ignored problem. At
present, effective and reasonable ship escort should be one of the best external safety
measures to protect LNG carriers in port.
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1.3

The current studies

Internationally, people has accumulated a great deal of experience in the safety
management of LNG carrier, LNG terminal management, cargo handling operations
and personnel training, and technologies and norms are becoming more integrated.
And many authoritative industry organizations such as the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and some of the ship classification societies
have published a number of LNG carrier transport-related technical standards and
operational guidelines.

The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) had studied
the frequency of accidents and the amount of cargo leakage that occurred in the LNG
industry during the period 1965-2007. The results showed that the indicators have
been reduced to a lower point after 2000; the main causes of the accident were
improper operation and improper equipment maintenance; the most of accidents
happened in the process of LNG loading and unloading; Earthquakes, typhoons and
other force majeure have little effect on the accidents occurrence. (Anthony &
Deborah & Pierre, 2013, p. 17)

Erik Vanem et al. Collected 182 LNG carrier accidents from 1964 to 2006, divided
them into eight types of risk models, quantified the risks by using event tree method,
and found that the risks were mainly concentrated in collision, grounding, fire or
explosion and loading or unloading accidents, in which the collision is the highest
risk value. The study concluded that the risks of LNG carrier transport are within
acceptable scope. (Vanema, Antaob, Østvikc, & Comas, 2008, p. 134)

The United States CH • IV international and the Center for Energy Economics (CEE)
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of the University of Texas publish LNG Industrial Safety Accident Statistic s at
regular intervals. The statistics on LNG carrier accidents indicate that LNG carriers
had maintained a good safety record, no large-scale leakage occurred. (Center for
Energy Economics [CEE], 2012, p.5)

In the report of "FSA, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers - Details of the Formal
Safety Assessment" (MSC 83 / INF.3) submitted by the Danish Government to IMO
in 2007, the 158 LNG carriers accidents occurred during transport were collected.
Through Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), the main risks are identified, analyzed
and controlled, and the control options are evaluated and the recommendations are
put forward. Not only provided the risk control options for LNG carrier
transportation, but also provided a scientific risk assessment method. (International
Maritime Organization [IMO], 2007, p.3)

The Moving Safety Zone in this paper is defined as that in the process of LNG
carrier navigating in port, in order to ensure the safe navigation, a certain area of
waters is set around it, which is a controlled area, other ships are prohibited from
entering. The scope of the area shall be related to the ship's maneuvering abilities, the
cargo hazards and the port navigational environment; the Leaking Hazard Zone is
defined as a dangerous area established after the occurrence of LNG carrier's
accident, if other unrelated ships and persons enter the area, they would suffer threats
to their own safety. The scope of the area is related to the severity of the accident, the
hazard extent of cargo and natural environment, etc.

In the article "Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Background and
Issues for Congress", Paul W. Parfomak referred to the safety zone and guard zone
around the LNG facility which was set up by the United States Coast Guard in
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response to terrorist threats. And the scopes of these areas were described;
meanwhile the necessary security measures were required to protect them. (Paul,
2003, p. 13)

In 2009, Professor Jamin Koo et al. used the event tree method to study the safety
issues of LNG receiving stations. Through the risk analysis software PHAST, they
simulated the accidental leakage of LNG, and obtain the dimensions of safety zone
and explosive hazard zone. (Koo, Kim, So, & Yoon, 2009, p.330)

In 2012, Doctor Michelle Michot Foss released the article of "LNG safety and
security". In this research report, some of the properties of LNG were summarized,
and proposed to establish a safety zone to protect LNG carriers, including the safety
measures, as well as the factors which would influence the establishment of a safety
zone. (CEE, 2012, p.39)

From 2008 to 2011, Sandia National Lab (the United States), according to the request
from The National Energy Board, carried out a series of experiments and
computational simulations for LNG carrier leakage, including containment system
damage and leaking analysis, tank hole size analysis after collision, large scale LNG
fire test, LNG hull steel plate low temperature damage a nalysis and LNG carrier joint
damage analysis, the results provide a comprehensive LNG leakage accident related
data. It is concluded that the hazard area of the LNG carrier can be determined
according to the heat flux within a certain period and area. (United States
Department of Energy [DOE], 2012, p.22)

In 2013, Henryk Sniegocki gave a comprehensive application of SIGTTO's
recommendations on LNG carriers' channel, underkeel clearance, air draught, turning
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waters, VTS, traffic separation scheme, moving safety zone and ship speed limits.
Finally, he recommended that people should follow the SIGTTO requirements and
recommendations and also should take into account the local situation. (Henryk,
2013, p. 420)

According to the "Design Code of General Layout for Sea Ports" (JTS165-2013)
issued by the Ministry of Transport of China in 2013, it requires traffic control and
boats escort when LNG carrier navigating in port water area. In addition to the escort,
other ships should keep at least 1 nm from the navigating LNG carriers. In practice,
to ensure the navigational safety of LNG carrier, most of ports have established their
own escort regime and moving safety zones. (Design Code of General Layout for
Sea Ports 2013)
1.4

Methodology and data resources

The study methods used in this paper include:
(1) Using general statistical analysis and cross analysis to analyze the accident data;
(2) Using the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) method recommended by IMO to
analyze the navigational risks of LNG carrier in port;
(3) Using the theory of ship domain in the field of Marine Traffic Engineering to
calculate and determine the scope of Moving Safety Zone.

The data in this paper are mainly derived from:
(1) International Maritime Organization（IMO）；
http://www.imo.org/
(2) The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers（GIIGNL）；
http://www.giignl.org/
(3) The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)；
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http://www.sigtto.org/
(4) CH·IV International；
http://www.ch- iv.com/
(5) Center for Energy Economics (CEE)；
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/
(6) United States Department of Energy (DOE)；
https://energy.gov/
(7) BP Amoco；
https://www.bp.com/
(8) International Gas Union (IGU)；
http://www.igu.org/
(9) Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
https://www.ocimf.org/
1.5

Structure of paper

In this research paper, the properties of LNG carriers and cargos are firstly
introduced in chapter 2. Then, the data of 170 LNG carrier accidents collected from
1964 to 2017 are analyzed, and the conclusion of most accidents happened in port is
drawn in chapter 3. Subsequently, in the chapter 4 the Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA) is carried out to prove the conclusion and to analyze the navigational risks of
LNG carriers. Furthermore, it is concluded that the risk of collision between LNG
carriers and merchant ships is a medium risk and should be controlled. In chapter 5, it
is decided to reduce the probability of collision by establishing the Moving Safety
Zone, and to mitigate the severity of consequence of the accident by setting the
Leakage Hazard Zone, and to protect the two zones by means of tugs or boats escort.
Simultaneously, through the studies on the theory of Ship Domain and the empirical
coefficient, the mathematical model of Moving Safety Zone is introduced, by which
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the scope of Moving Safety Zone can be quantitatively calculated and obtained. On
the other hand, the pool fire experimental results of Sandia National Labs are used to
classify 3 categories of Leaking Hazard Zones of LNG carrier. Finally, the general
standards, requirements, plans and supports for tugs or boats escort are recommended
to enhance the practicality of this paper.
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CHAPTER 2
LNG and LNG carrier
2.1

Properties of LNG
2.1.1

Physicochemical properties

Methane is the main component of Natural gas. It is classified as Class 2.1 dangerous
goods in "International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code" (IMDG Code), which is
with the properties of colorless, odorless, non-toxic, flammable, incorrosive, soluble
in oil, but insoluble in water, softening rubber, etc. Under a standard atmospheric
pressure, the gaseous density is 0.7174kg/m³, the relative density of 0.5548 (relative
to the air density), lighter than air; it can be liquefied either by compre ssing or by
cooling; the boiling point is -161.5℃.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is obtained by cooling the natural gas under an
atmospheric pressure to -162℃, so that to facilitate storage and transportation. 1m³
LNG gasification can be about 600m³ of natural gas (Nakazawa, 2016, p.60). The
liquid density of LNG is about 45% of the water density; it will float on the surface if
leaking into water.
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2.1.2

Leaking hazards

(1) Pool fires. If LNG spills occur near an ignition source, a mix of the evaporating
gas and air will burn above the LNG pool. Such pool fires are intense and burn far
more rapidly and hotly than e.g. oil and gasoline fires. Furthermore, they cannot
easily be extinguished and all the LNG must normally be consumed before they go
out (IMO, 2007, P.8). Methane flammable range is between 5% and 15% (CEE, 2012,
p.14), as shown in Figure 2.1. For methane vapors derived from LNG, with a fuel-air
mixture of about 10 percent methane in air and atmospheric pressure, the

autoignition temperature is above 1000°F (540°C) (CEE, 2012, p.15).
Figure 2.1 - Flammable Range for Methane (LNG)
Source: CEE. (2012). LNG safety and security. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/LNG_Safety_and_Security_Update_2012.pdf

(2) Cryogenic temperatures. LNG is produced by cooling down the natural gas to
-162°C. If it is released, direct contact with the cryogenic liquid will freeze the point
of contact and damage tissues of humans, animals and aquatic fauna. Embrittlement
leading to structural failure and equipment damage may also occur when materials
not designed for such low temperatures come into contact with LNG. (IMO, 2007,
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p.8)
(3) Asphyxiation. Because the volume of LNG is only 1/600 of the volume of natural
gas at atmospheric pressure, a non- ignited LNG vapor could displace breathable air
(IMO, 2007, p.8), causing the oxygen content in the air to drop rapidly. If the oxygen
content in the air is less than 15%, the human behavior will be affected. If the oxygen
content is reduced to below 6%, the person in this air will die.
(4) Rapid Phase Transition. LNG leakage occurs and contacts with water, because the
density of LNG is smaller than the water’s, it will float on the surface of water. If a
large number of LNG leak to the water, it may vaporize too quickly causing a rapid
phase transition (RPT) (CEE, 2012, p.19). Such a rapid phase transition might have
the potential to shatter windows and glass nearby but is only assumed to constitute a
minor hazard to nearby people and structures (IMO, 2007, p.8).
(5) Explosion. LNG is obtained by low temperature treatment at atmospheric
pressure, so the damage to the cargo hold cannot cause an explosion. However, if the
LNG inside the containment system is affected by an external fire source, the
pressure in the tank will increase rapidly, eventually causing the explosion. This is
called the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Expansion (BLEVE). According to
record, LNG carrier has not suffered such incidents, but liquefied petroleum gas
storage tank had such an accident. (Alderman, 2005, p. 147)
2.2

Specialties of LNG carrier
2.2.1

General specialties

(1) High construction cost. LNG carriers transport LNG with -162 ℃ low
temperature, such ship is a high-tech, high challenge and high value product, single
carrier cost about 200 million US dollars.
(2) Strict construction requirements. LNG carrier is a 2G type ship. A type 2G ship is
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a gas carrier intended to transport the products that require significant prototypes to
preclude their escape. (International Code for the Construction and Equipment of
Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk [IGC], 2014, p. 17)
(3) Gigantism. In recent years, due to the strong competition of LNG world trade, the
loading capacity of single LNG carrier is continuously increased. At present the
largest Q-Max type LNG carrier loading capacity has reached 260,000m3 .
(4) High freeboard. Due to the special structure of LNG cargo hold, the freeboard of
carrier is higher than ordinary ships, so the impact of wind and current will be more
obvious than others. At the same time, due to the small density of goods, the center
of gravity of LNG carrier would also be higher after loading.
2.2.2

Structural features

Depending on the different cargo containment system, LNG carriers engaged in
ocean- going transport are dominated by two types of design, spherical type and
membrane type. Both spherical and membrane carriers are double-hulled, equipped
with 4-6 cargo tanks and no longitudinal bulkheads.
(1) Spherical type LNG carrier (Moss type): the patent of spherical tank belongs to
Norway Moss Maritime Corporation (http://www.mossww.com), which launched in
1973 for the first time. The cargo tank is made of aluminum alloy, and the shape is a
sphere. The wind effect is strong to the carrier due to the high freeboard and tank
shape. It is difficult to maneuver with low ship’s speed, and the blind area in front of
ship is large.
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Figure 2.2: Side view of spherical type LNG carrier
Source: Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web: http://www.wikiwand.co m/fr/Méthanier

(2) Membrane type LNG carrier: the patented technology is developed by the French
company Gaztransportz & Technigaz (GTT) (http://www.gtt.fr). The main models
are Mark III and No.96. The loading capacity of cargo tank is large, and the wind
effect is small on deck, the view from bridge is better than Moss type. But the height
of LNG in tank is limited due to sloshing effect (CEE, 2012, p.19).

Figure 2.3: Side view of membrane type LNG carrier
Source: Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web: http://www.wikiwand.co m/fr/Méthanier

2.2.3

Maneuvering characteristics

(1) Large blind area, significant impact from wind and current. Due to the structural
features of LNG cargo tank, LNG carrier has a larger blind area, keeping lookout is
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more difficult. On the other hand, LNG carrier has higher freeboard and wider body.
When encountered with strong wind or current, the impact will be more obvious than
ordinary ships.
(2) Big inertia force due to the gigantism of ship. One of the common characteristics
of large ships is the large inertia force, coupled with the structural characteristics of
LNG carriers, which led to the ship's longer stopping distance.
(3) Bad rudder efficiency. Compared with ordinary ships, LNG carrier has relatively
poor rudder efficiency. Especially in the case of full loaded, LNG carrier's huge
inertia will affect the ship’s steering; prolong the reaction time of course altering. As
a result, the officers or captain of LNG carrier are required to take measures earlier;
when at the low speed, they are required to take a large steering angle to overcome.
(4) Poor heading stability. LNG carriers, especially large LNG carriers, are relatively
poor in heading stability. Some of LNG carriers are equipped with bow thruster, but
the power is often not enough.

In summary, the LNG carrier's maneuverability is relatively poor, and considering
the high risk of LNG cargo, it needs larger water area for buffering. So the safety
zone is set in some ports, and patrol boats and tugs escort are very necessary.
2.2.4

LNG fleets

At the end of 2016, the total LNG tanker fleet consisted of 478 vessels at the end of
2016. It included 24 FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit) and 30
vessels of less than 50,000 cubic meters. Total shipping capacity at the end of 2016
stood at 69.3 million cubic meters. Total operational capacity (vessels that are known
to be in service) amounted to 64.7 million cubic meters (GIIGNL, 2017, p.12). 10
new orders were placed, including one FSRU and 3 bunkering vessels. Comparing
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with 33 new orders placed in 2015. This is the lowest number of new orders since
2010. At the end of 2016, the order book comprised of 137 carriers, 121 of which
were above 50,000 cubic meters. 64 vessels were scheduled for delivery in
2017(GIIGNL, 2017, P12).

For the ship’s type, at the end of 2016, there were 337 membrane type LNG carriers,
115 moss types and only 26 other types. In the case of loading capacity, 349 LNG
carriers (73%) were within the loading capacity of 90,000-170,000 m3 , 90 ships were
Q-Flex and Q-Max (19%) models. In terms of age, the average age of current fleet is
about 11 years and nearly 60% of ships are below 10 years and nearly 80% of ships
are less than 15 years old. The following figure 2.4 gives more details.

Figure 2.4: LNG fleets at the end of 2016
Source: GIIGNL. (2017). annual report 2017. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web:
http://giignl.org/sites/default/files/PUBLIC_AREA/Publications/giignl_2017_report_0.pdf

At present, the world's largest LNG shipwners include Qatar Gas, Petronas, Teekay
Corporation and Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL). Among them, up to the early of 2017, the
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fleet of Qatar Gas consists of 63 wholly- and jointly-owned LNG, and has a
combined carrying capacity of over 8.5 million cubic meters or 15% of the world
capacity (http://www.nakilat.com.qa/Page/Vessel). Teekay Shipping. Up to May 2017,
its LNG fleet includes 32 wholly-owned carriers and other 18 newbuildings are on
order, and has a combined carrying capacity of over 5.5 million cubic meters or 9%
of the world capacity (http://teekay.com/fleet/).
2.3

Chapter summary

In this chapter, the hazards of LNG transportation are introduced from the aspects of
LNG cargo and carrier respectively, the structural features of LNG carrier are
explained and the present LNG fleets in the world are introduced. Meanwhile, the
maneuvering abilities of LNG carrier are summarized to pave the way for the
accident analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
Data analysis
3.1

Scope of data collection

The LNG carrier accident data collected in this paper is mainly composed of two
parts:
(1) Most of the accident data is derived from a document “FSA − Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) Carriers − Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3)
issued by IMO. The report was submitted by the Government of Denmark in 2007 to
conduct a risk assessment of LNG carriers in accordance with today's highly
respected Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). In the report, Erik Vanem and Rolf
Skjong et al. collected a total of 182 incidents and accidents related to LNG carriers
with more than 62,000 GRTs from 1964 to 2005 (including 2005), in which 24
accidents were caused in the process of ship’s construction, dock maintenance, pirate
attacks, towing, trial flights, so they were removed. The remaining 158 incidents and
accidents were taken as standard samples and were analyzed in detail in the report.
(IMO, 2007, p.5)
(2) After 2005, the LNG carrier market had experienced several delivery peaks. The
number of fleets had grown from just exceeding 200 (2006) to 478 (2017). Due to
the influence of market supply and demand and ship’s gigantism, many advanced
technologies have been applied to the construction of new LNG carriers, which are
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far-reaching for the safety of LNG carriers in the future. In order to reflect the rapid
growth of the number of LNG carriers in the past 10 years and consider the safety
improvement brought by advanced technology as far as possible, this paper collected
13 cases of LNG carrier incidents and accidents (see appendix) from the beginning of
2006 to the early of 2017. One of them is removed because of pirate attack. The
remaining 12 accidents, combined with the 158 incidents collected from the IMO
report, total 170 LNG carrier accidents are analyzed in this paper.
3.2

Overview of statistical indicators

The following 3 statistical indicators are selected to analysis the accident data of
LNG carriers:
(1) Accident time. Refers to the year when the accident occurred, which can better
reflect the time distribution of the accidents. Every five years is a time period in this
paper;
(2) Ship status when accident occurred. A complete LNG carrier voyage cycle
includes: loading at LNG export terminal, followed by long distance sailing to LNG
receiving terminal, after unloading at the receiving terminal, back to the export
terminal. The main operations of the LNG carrier during the whole period can be
divided into Loading/Unloading, Maneuvering in port, Mooring/Anchoring, En route
and others (incomplete records). (Chen, 2015, p.21)
(3) Accident types. In this paper, the types of LNG carrier accidents are divided into
7 categories (in IMO MSC 83/INF.3 report, the types of accident were classified into
8 categories. In this paper, combine the collision with contact as 1 category), which
are: cargo leaking while loading and unloading (L/U), collision or contact (Col/Cnt),
grounding (Grd), fire or explosion (FE), ship equipment failure (EM), heavy
weather (HW) and cargo containment system damage (CCS).
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3.3

Summary of overall accidents

A total of 170 LNG carrier accidents from 1964 to 2017 are collected in this paper.
Figure 3.1 shows the time distribution of accidents as per 5-year interval (only 4
years from 2014 to 2007). The number of historical accidents experienced a rapidly
increase from the early of 1970s. After 10 years, around the year of 1980, it reached
the peak and then declined suddenly. Until the beginning of 1990s, it recovered to the
level of the early of 1970s, which was around 10 accidents every 5- year. Finally, it
stabilized below 10 accidents in each period.

Since the LNG carrier was officially put into operation in 1964, the number of LNG
carrier accidents increased from less than 10 accidents per 5 years to 70 accidents
around the early of 1980s. Then the number surged to the historical peak (70
accidents from 1979 to 1983), accounting for 41.2% of the total number, and soon
dropped in the beginning of 1980s. However, the overall number of accidents in
1980s was still higher than other periods. In the 1990s, the trend of LNG carrier
accidents tended to be stable, approximate 10 accidents in each 5 years. After
entering the 20th century, in every 5 years the number of accidents further dropped to
the single digits. In the total 170 accidents, there were 28 accidents of LNG cargo
leakage; all the accidents did not result in death of crewmember. If separating the
location of the 170 accidents into in port and en route, there were 113 cases happened
in port, 42 occurred en route, and other 15 accidents cannot be inferred through the
records. It is clear that the number of accidents occurred in port is significantly larger
than that en route.
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Figure 3.1: Number of LNG carrier accidents per 5 years, 1964-2017

Some experts had expressed doubts about the surge in accidents from the late 1970s
to the early 1980s, and they had also analyzed the phenomenon in the assessment
report submitted to the IMO by the Danish government, believing that “Possibly, the
relatively high number of casual occur from 1976 to 1985 may be due to
underreporting of accidents by periods and do not necessarily mean that the actual
number of which was very much higher in this period (E.g. information about merely
four incidents occurring during the years 1991-1995 seems very low). (IMO, 2007,
p.21)
3.4

Statistical analysis
3.4.1

Accident time

The period of 1974-1988 had experienced the highest frequency of LNG carrier
accidents, 110 accidents, accounting for 54% of the total number, and an average of
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37 accidents every 5 years, much more than other periods with the average level of
7.5 accidents every 5 years. The main reasons for causing this situation may be found
in the aspects of technology, management and personnel qualification.
(1) The design and construction technology for LNG carrier at early day was in an
experimental and initial stage. There are Conch type, Esso type and Worms type
LNG carriers (collectively referred to as "other types") before the occurrence of
Membrane type and Moss type. France's Gaz Transport No.82 membrane type LNG
carrier first appeared in 1969, France's Technigaz's Mark I type membrane type LNG
carrier was first introduced in 1972, and Norway’s Moss Maritime's first moss type
LNG carrier was built in 1973. Compared with other types, they are more advanced
in technology and safer for crew.
(2) At the beginning of 1980s, although the fleets of LNG carriers were continuously
increasing, the conventions or norms for LNG carrier design and construction, LNG
cargo handling and personnel training had been delayed. The design and construction
of the original LNG carrier was in accordance with the requirements issued by
classification societies. And when it became aware of the need for a globally
harmonized rule, IMO established “the International Code for the Construction and
Equipment of Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC)”, which adopt as the mandatory
amendments to the SOLAS Convention and entered into force at 1 July 1986. This
convention significantly promoted the safety management level of LNG carriers.
(3) The above two points are more from the view of "ship". For controlling the
“human factors” in LNG carrier accidents, except the requirements of IMO
Convention, some standards and guidelines issued by committees and organizations
are also contributing. The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal
Operators (SIGTTO) was established in 1979 with an initial 13memberships
(http://www.sigtto.org). It was established to harmonize the safe operating standards
between carriers and terminals. The members of the organization shared technical
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experiences or work with other related organizations to develop technical
specifications and operational guidelines to improve the operational safety of LNG
carriers, terminals and personnel. Today, the members of SIGTTO control 97% of
LNG carriers and terminals around the world. More than 50 books, guide lines and
recommendations have been published, covering all aspects of LNG shipping
industry.

Similarly, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

(https://www.ocimf.org/) was established in 1970, similar to the nature of SIGTTO,
the members are major oil companies. In addition to the publication of the standards
and guidelines, OCIMF also presented the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) in 1993 to
inspect the OCIMF members' ships in accordance with the SIRE procedure. The
inspection is not only closely related to the management of the tanker, but also
related to ship management and crew quality. SIGTTO and OCIMF's industry
standards are usually subject to the IMO Convention.

It can be seen that the most frequent occurrence of LNG carrier accidents was in the
period of 1974-1988, which was just the time before IMO and those organizations
launching the convention and guidelines. The number of LNG carrier accidents has
been significantly reduced after the promulgation of the above rules and regulations.
3.4.2

Ship status

In this paper, when accidents occurred the status of LNG carriers are divided into 5
categories,

which

includes

Loading/Unloading,

Maneuvering

in

port,

Mooring/Anchoring, En route and others (incomplete records). Through the
analysis to the selected 170 accident samples (as shown in Table 3.1), It is known
that the number of the accidents occurred during cargo handling operations is the
largest (56 cases), accounting for 32.9% of the total, followed by 43 accidents
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occurred during the ship Maneuvering in port, and 14 accidents occurred when ships
were anchoring or mooring. The above status normally happened in port, totally
accounting for 66.5% of the all accidents.
Table 3.1- The overall distribution of LNG carriers’ status when accident
occurred
Operation

Occurrence No.

Percentage

Cumulative
Percent

Loading/Unloading

56

32.9%

32.9%

Manoeuvring in port

43

25.3%

58.2%

Mooring/Anchoring

14

8.3%

66.5%

En route

42

24.7%

91.2%

Others

15

8.8%

100%

Total

170

100%

Source：Primary data are derived fro m the IM O report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers
− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of ship’s status when accident occurred over every 5
years. The accidents occurred during loading and unloading operations still rank the
first, with an average of 5.1 accidents every 5 years. The accidents occurred during
maneuvering in port changed significantly over the periods, with 79.1% occurred
before 1989. The accidents occurred during anchoring and mooring were few and
scattered. The number of accidents occurred during sailing en route and the number
of the accidents occurred during maneuvering in port were almost the same, with 3.8
accidents per 5 years. Sum up the accidents occurred in ports, we could obtain an
average of 10.3 accidents per 5 years, which are almost 3 times of the average
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number of accidents occurred outside of ports. Based on the above analysis, we may
conclude that the accidents involving LNG carriers often occurred in port.
Table 3.2- The every 5-year distribution of LNG carriers’ status when accident
occurred
Time (year)

Loading/
Unloading

Manoeuvring
In port

Mooring/
Anchoring

En route

Others Total

1964-1968

3

0

0

1

1

5

1969-1973

4

1

0

2

1

8

1974-1978

6

3

3

2

1

15

1979-1983

20

22

2

19

7

70

1984-1988

9

8

2

4

2

25

1989-1993

5

2

2

2

1

12

1994-1998

2

2

0

2

0

6

1999-2003

2

3

2

3

2

12

2004-2008

2

2

0

3

0

7

2009-2013

3

0

0

3

0

6

2014-2017

0

0

3

1

0

4

Total

56

43

14

42

15

170

Source：Primary data are derived fro m the IM O report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers
− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper

3.4.3

Accident types

In this paper, the types of LNG carrier accidents are divided into 7 categories, which
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include cargo leaking while loading and unloading (L/U), collision or contact
(Col/Cnt), grounding (Grd), fire or explosion (FE), ship equipment failure (EM),
heavy weather (HW) and cargo containment system damage (CCS). The percentage
and cumulative percent of the 7 types of accidents are shown in Table 3.3. The ship
equipment failure (EM) (60 cases) was the most frequent accidents, accounting for
35.3% of the total number of the accidents, followed by the collision or contact
(Col/Cnt) accidents and cargo containment system damage (CCS) accidents, which
also reached as many as 30 cases and 27cases respectively. The accidents of cargo
leakage while loading and unloading (L/U) were also very frequent accidents, which
were 24 cases. The frequency of fire or explosion (FE), grounding (Grd) and heavy
weather (HW) were less than others, each only no more than 10 cases. Judging from
the frequency of accidents, the most frequent two types of accidents were the ship
equipment failure (EM) and collision or contact (Col/Cnt).
Table 3.3- The distribution of the types of LNG carriers’ accidents
Type

Occurrence No.

Percentage

Cumulative percent

(accidents)

(%)

(%)

EM

60

35.3%

35.3%

Col/Cnt

30

17.6%

52.9%

CCS

27

15.9%

68.8%

L/U

24

14.1%

82.9%

FE

10

5.9%

88.8%

Grd

10

5.9%

94.7%

HW

9

5.3%

100%

Total

170

100%

Source：Primary data are derived fro m the IM O report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers
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− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper

3.4.4

Cross analysis

Subsequently, a cross-analysis of the distribution of accident types and ship status are
shown in Table 3.4:
Table 3.4 - The cross analysis between accident types and ship status
Type

Loading/
Unloading

Manoeuvring
In port

19/26%

12/27.9%

4/28.6%

22/52.3%

Col/Cnt

2/4%

18/41.9%

3/21.4%

CCS

4/8%

3/7.0%

L/U

24/48%

FE

7/14%

EM

Mooring/
Anchoring

En route

Others

Total

3/20%

60

7/16.7%

0

30

4/28.6%

9/21.4%

7/46.7%

27

0

0

0

0

24

2/4.7%

0

0

1/6.7%

10

Grd

0

5/11.6%

2/14.3%

3/7.1%

0

10

HW

0

3/7.0%

1/7.1%

1/2.4%

4/26.7%

9

Total

56

43

14

42

15

170

Source：Primary data are derived fro m the IM O report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers
− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper

As can be seen from Table 3.4, the most of categories of accident types occurred in
the process of LNG carrier maneuvering in port (6 kinds of accident types had
appeared), in which the most common type of accidents was collision or contact
(Col/Cnt), accounting for 41.9%, followed by equipment failure (EM) accounting
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for 27.9%. The proportion of grounding (Grd) accidents also reached 11.6%.
Through the cross analysis, it can be seen that due to the port limit, including narrow
navigable waters and high density traffic, the mainly external threat to the safety of
LNG carriers in port is collision risk.
3.5

Chapter summary

In this chapter, the author mainly analyzed the historical accident data of LNG
carriers. Through the overview of accident trends and the analysis for the three
statistical indicators (the accident time, ship status and accident types), the following
conclusions are drawn: the number of LNG carrier accidents reached a peak around
1980s, and then with the improvement of relevant technology and promulgation of
mandatory conventions, the trend of accidents has been effectively curbed; In all 170
incidents, the most of accidents occurred in ports, accounting for 66.5%. The
collision is a major risk threatening the safety of LNG carriers while maneuvering in
port.
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CHAPTER 4
Risk assessment
4.1

Risk factors

The influential factors to the safety of LNG carrier while maneuvering in port
include but not limited to human factors, ship factors and navigational environment.
4.1.1

Human factors

Human factors mainly include the crew’s misoperation, carelessness and negligence
etc., which could cause ship’s accident. It is widely believed that about 80% of
marine accidents are caused by human factors. Therefore, it is very important to
study the human factors and analyze the risks of personnel behavior in shipping and
take corresponding preventive measures. In order to ensure the safety of LNG
carriers while maneuvering in port and to reduce the impact of human factors, all
crewmembers served on board a LNG carrier should hold the qualification
certificates issued in accordance with STCW convention. In addition, the crew
should also have the necessary safety knowledge and operational skills for LNG,
hold the appropriate certificate of competency or special training certificate.
4.1.2

Ship factors

Ship factors include both the ship itself and the ship management. Ship’s quality and
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its seaworthiness are the prerequisite for safe navigation. Of course, the factors of
ship itself include but not limited that whether the fire-fighting equipment,
life-saving appliances, navigation equipment and other mechanical and electrical
equipment are in good order.
4.1.3

Navigational environment

(1) Navigable waters. It refers to the safe place or space for ship’s movement,
composed of port waters and waterways. The port waters include harbor basin,
mooring area, anchorage, U-turn area, etc. The waterway is a lane with a certain
depth, width, clearance height and bending radius which can be safely used for
navigating.
(2) Natural environment. It refers to the weather, hydrology, terrain condition, etc.
Meteorological conditions include visibility, wind, water depth, current, tides, waves,
freezing, etc.; terrain conditions include the width and bend of the waterway, uneven
bottom, shoal reefs, etc.
(3) Traffic conditions. It refers to the layout of the port and waterways, navigation
aids and facilities, traffic flow and density, VTS management, etc.
4.2

Identification of hazards

The purpose of hazard identification is to identify a list of hazards and associated
scenarios prioritized by risk level specific to the problem under review. This purpose
is achieved by the use of standard techniques to identify hazards which can
contribute to accidents, and by screening these hazards using a combination of
available data and judgment (IMO, 2015, p.8). It is the first step of Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA). The methods of hazard identification include identification of
possible hazards and ranking them:
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(1) Identification of possible hazards : The approach used for hazard identification
generally comprises a combination of both creative and analytical techniques, the
aim being to identify all relevant hazards. And a coarse analysis of possible causes
and initiating events and outcome of each accident scenario should be carried out.
(IMO, 2015, p.8)
(2) Ranking: The identified hazards and their associated scenarios relevant to the
problem under consideration should be ranked to prioritize them and to discard
scenarios judged to be of minor significance. (IMO, 2015, p.8)

According to the results of LNG carrier accident statistics analysis in chapter 3 of
this paper, and refer to other researches regarding the safety of LNG shipment, the
hazards of LNG carrier navigating in port mainly include 3 categories and rank them
as follow:
(1) LNG carriers collide with other ships (LNG carrier collision);
(2) LNG carriers contact with pier or other mooring ships (LNG carrier contact);
(3) Navigational accident related to severe natural environment (Severe natural
environment).
4.3

Risk analysis

After identifying the potential risks for LNG carrier navigating in ports, the risk
value of each risk items should be quantitatively analyzed by use of accident and
failure data and other sources of information as appropriate to the level of analysis.
The risk analysis refers to the process of quantifying the probability of accident
occurrence and the severity of accident consequence, which could be obtained by
analyzing the historical accident data and estimating the loss of life and property. The
procedure includes: analyzing the likelihood of occurrence of a risk event
(probability); estimating the severity of hazard of the possible risk event
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(consequence); calculating the risk value of the possible risk event.

The risk analysis is estimated for all uncertainties and risk factors in the process of
LNG carrier navigating in port. A comprehensive and systematic analysis of the
probability of each risk and the severity of the consequence should be carried out.
The main task of risk analysis is to rank the risk scenario. In the follow-up risk
assessment, we need only to analyze the high risk and medium risk events in detail,
ignore the low risk events, grasp the key points, and reduce the risk value. Therefore,
the objects of the risk analysis for LNG carrier navigating in port are to analyze the
individual risks, rather than the societal risks.
4.3.1

The methods of risk analysis

The methods of risk analysis include risk probability estimation method and risk
consequence estimation method. The risk probability estimation is mostly based on
statistical analysis and inference method. Statistical analysis refers to the historical
statistical data or a large number of tests to estimate the probability, which is an
objective estimate; inference method is that when the data is incomplete, experts
based on experience, knowledge or similar events to infer the probability, which is a
personal subjective judgment. Risk consequence estimation methods include
probabilistic tree analysis, Monte Carlo simulation, etc. Mainly through the use of
modern computer technology, the use of probability theory and mathematical
statistics principles for probability analysis, indicating the severity of the risk.

The risk is determined by the consequences and the probability. The risk matrix is
an effective risk management tool which can achieve quantitative risk analysis by
estimating the consequences and the probability. The basic idea of the risk matrix is
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to establish a standardized matrix for the reference of ranking risk. Through proper
quantifying and ranking the consequence and probability of risks, people can
establish a standard matrix for the reference of an identified risk, and determine the
rank of the risk. By ranking the risk, people can concentrated on the high a nd
medium risk and ignore the low one.

In this paper, the risk probability (P) is divided into 4 ranks, from 1 (Extremely
remote) to 4 (Frequent), as listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1- The frequency index of risk occurrence

Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IM O docu ment “Revised
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule -making Process”
(MSC-MEPC.2/ Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015).

The severity of consequences (C) is also divided into 4 ranks, from 1 (Minor) to 4
(Catastrophic), see Table 4.2. Among them, the severity of consequence is related to
property losses, personnel injuries and other factors. Because LNG leakage has little
impact on the environment, environmental damage factors are not considered.
Table 4.2- The severity index of consequence

32

Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IM O docu ment “Revised
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule -making Process”
(MSC-MEPC.2/ Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015).

To facilitate the ranking and validation of ranking, it is generally recommended to
define consequence and probability indices on a logarithmic scale. A risk index may
therefore be established by adding the probability/frequency and consequence indices
(IMO, 2015, p.39).

In general: Risk (R') = Probability (P') * Consequence (C')
So
P '- actual probability, the corresponding probability rank is P, and P = log (P');
C'- actual consequence, the corresponding consequence rank is C, and C = log (C');
R'- actual risk, the corresponding risk rank is R, and R = log (R').
So it is possible to quantify the risk value using the following formula: R = P + C.
(IMO, 2015, p.39)
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The risk matrix for LNG carriers navigating in port is shown in Table 4.3 and the risk
ranks are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.3- Risk matrix

Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IM O docu ment “Revised
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule-making Process”
(MSC-MEPC.2/ Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015).

Table 4.4- Risk rank

Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IM O docu ment “Revised
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule-making Process”
(MSC-MEPC.2/ Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015).

4.3.2

Risk estimation

According to the risk matrix, the rank of the risks identified in section 4.2 could be
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estimated as shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5- Risk estimation of LNG carrier navigating in port
Hazards

Accidents & Incidents

P

C R

LNGC collides with tug

2

1

3

LNGC collides with barge

2

2

4

LNGC collides with fishing boat

3

1

4

LNGC collides with commercial ship

2

3

5

LNGC contacts with obstruction

2

1

3

LNGC contacts with wharf or other port constructions

1

2

3

LNGC contacts with mooring ship

2

2

4

Severe weather

1

3

4

Typhoon

1

3

4

Earthquake

1

3

4

Adverse tide or current

2

2

4

Poor visibility

3

1

4

LNGC collision

LNGC contact

Severe

natural

environment

In general, due to the uncertainties of small draft boats maneuvering in port, the
probability of collision involving LNG carriers and them (e.g. fishing boats) would
be reasonably probable, but to consider the little damage to large LNG carriers, the
consequence is minor, so the risks is low. By contrast, although the probability of
collision involving LNG carriers and other big merchant ships navigating in port is
remote, the consequence would be severe, so the risk is medium. To consider the
risks result from the severe natural environment like typhoon, the consequence
would normally significant or severe. However, because the minor probability of
occurrence of natural catastrophes and the weather is predictable, so the risk is low.
In conclusion, the risk of collision involving LNG carriers and other merchant ships
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is medium risk, which should be controlled.
4.4

Risk control options

For the medium risk, there are some effective measures and options to deal with.
Through the proper service and management of port VTS, it can be controlled. And
the mandatory pilotage is also a good choice. In this paper, the safety escort of LNG
carrier in port would be discussed in the following chapter.
4.5

Chapter summary

In this chapter, the risk analysis for LNG carrier navigating in port is carried out by
the mean of FSA. Firstly, the influential factors to the safety navigation of LNG
carriers are introduced from three aspects: human, ship and environment. Secondly,
according to the conclusion of chapter 3 the hazards to LNG carriers are identified.
And then the risks of causing these hazards are quantificationally analyzed by using
risk matrix. It is concluded that the risk of collision involving LNG carriers and other
merchant ships in port is a medium risk and should be controlled. Finally, one of the
risk control options, safety escort, is mentioned to prepare for next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
Safety escort
According to the statistical analysis of LNG carrier accident in Chapter 3, it is known
that the frequency of collision accident is the highest (accounting for 41.9%) while
LNG carriers navigating in port. By the risk analysis in Chapter 4, it is concluded
that the risk of collision involving LNG carriers and other merchant ships in port is a
medium risk, which should be controlled. The risk estimation method described in
Section 4.3.1 shows that the risk of an accident is determined by the probability and
the consequence of the accident. Therefore, to reduce the risk, people have to
minimize the probability of collision and the severity of consequence.

A port authority could reduce the probability and the consequence of collision
through establishing a traffic separation scheme to separate opposite traffic flows,
and through establishing a port VTS to harmonize the traffic situation and to enhance
the emergency response. The ship could reduce the probability and consequence of
collision through using AIS, ECDIS and other advanced navigational equipment to
assist collision avoidance, and through carrying out emergency drill to promote the
safety awareness of crewmember. Of course, the implementation of safety escort for
LNG carriers in port is also a good way to reduce the probability and the
consequence of collision. In order to well organize the escort, two kinds of zones
would be discussed in this chapter, one is the Moving Safety Zone, and another is the
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Leaking Hazard Zone.
5.1

Moving Safety Zone
5.1.1

Definition

The Safety Zone of LNG carrier has always been an important concept in
navigational safety management and research. In the process of LNG carrier entering
and leaving the port, in order to protect its navigation safety, a certain range of waters
is usually set around the LNG carriers. And some escort tugs are arranged at the
boundary of the water area, to warn other ships in vicinity, and to avoid the entry of
them, who would pose a threat to the normal navigation of LNG carriers. This area is
commonly referred to as the Safety Zone of LNG carriers. Considering that the
location and range of the zone would change with the movement of the LNG carrier,
the zone is also known as the Moving Safety Zone, as shown in Figure 5.1. The
establishment of Moving Safety Zone can effectively improve the navigation safety
of LNG carriers and reduce the probability of collision accident.

Figure 5.1: Sketch map of moving safety zone

5.1.2

Reference

Up to now, there is no uniform standard for establishing a Moving Safety Zone, and
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lack of relevant research. Different countries and ports have various requirements, as
shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Scopes of safety zone around LNG carrier

Source: Various collections

5.1.3

Ship Domain

In 1963, Fujii, a pioneer of Japan Marine Traffic Engineering, developed the concept
of Ship Domain in the study of the traffic capacity of a waterway, and released an
article entitled "Traffic Capacity" in the British Journal of Navigation in 1971. In the
article he defined the ship domain as the area around a ship where the most of other
ships would avoid entering into (Fujii & Tanaka, 1971, p.545). Afterward, the British
scholar Goodwin defined it as: an effective water area around a ship, where is
necessary for the ship to maintain the navigational safety (Goodwin, 1975, p.330).
Since then, British scholars Davis, Lewison, Goldwel, Abdel- Gali, Dutch scholar
Van-der Tak and other scholars commenced to research and establish different type
of mathematical model for ship domain and posed different views (Davis, Dove &
Stockel, 1980, p.219). The theory of ship domain was developed gradually.

It can be seen that the definition of Ship Domain is basically the same as that of
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Moving Safety Zone and the function is exactly the same. Therefore, we can quantify
the scope of Moving Safety Zone by studying the domain of LNG carrier.
5.1.4

Mathematical model

Fujii conducted a series of marine traffic surveys in coastal waters of Japan and
analyzed the two-dimensional frequency distribution of the relative position of the
ships. The model of Ship Domain in coastal waters was obtained. It was an ellipse
around the ship, as shown in Figure 5.2 (Wu & Zhu, 2004, p. 120). The long axis was
about as long as 8 times of ship’s length (L) and the short axis was about 3.2 times of
the length of the ship. When the ship navigated in port or narrow strait, the ellipse
would shrink to 6L as the long axis and 1.6L as the short axis.

Figure 5.2: Sketch map of Fujii model for Ship Domain
Source: Wu, Z. L., & Zhu, J. (2004). Marine Traffic Engineering. Dalian: Dalian Maritime University
Press.

The scope of Ship Domain is affected by three factors, which are human factor
(captain, officers, etc.), ship factor (speed, maneuverability, etc.) and external
conditions (traffic density, hydrometeorological conditions, etc.). It is difficult to
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obtain by mathematic calculation. However, through the long-term observation
method, people can draw a position distribution map around the observed ship, and
obtain a blank area around her, where can be seen as the Ship Domain of the ship. It
is indeed a more practical approach. In this paper, the model of Fujii Ship Domain
is adopted to set the Moving Safety Zone around a LNG carrier.

Most of Scholars' researches on the field of Ship Domain were concentrated in the
1960s and 1970s. At that time the ship size and speed, traffic density, navigational
equipment, communications equipment, safety management, etc. were quite different
from present. The implementation of ISM greatly improved the level of ship safety
management, effectively reducing the impact of human factors. Most of port waters
are covered by VTS, which has already reduced the risk of collision significantly. On
the other hand, in recent years, the ship's gigantism, high-speed trend is more
obvious, the cost of ship and the sensitivity of port waters are also continuously
increased. All of these factors will influence the scope of Ship Domain. Therefore,
the scope of Ship Domain would be quite different from Fujii model. So the
observed dime nsions of Fujii model would be not adopted in this paper. It is
intended to obtain the scope of Ship Domain by calculating and setting empirical
parameters.
5.1.5

Quantitative calculation

The Ship Domain of a LNG carrier in port water area is set to be elliptical, and the
long axis (Y-axis) of the ellipse is the ship’s course (over ground). Taking into
account the research results of Fujii, Goodwin and other scholars, and for the
convenience of calculation, the LNG carrier is placed in the center of ellipse, as
shown in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Sketch map of ellipse model Ship Domains

Assume that: M（x, y）is an arbitrary point on the ellipse; A (0，-a); F (0，a); S (b，
0); P (-b，0), so∣M F1 ∣＋∣M F2 ∣＝2a. The standard equation of the ellipse
(focuses on Y-axis) is

𝑦2

𝑥2

+ 𝑏2 = 1 (a> b > 0), the coordinates of focuses is F1 (0, c),
𝑎2

F2 (0, -c), and c2 =a2 -b2 .

Assume that: the length overall of the LNG carrier is L (m), therefore the length of
the long semi-axis of the ellipse: a=C*L (m); the length of short semi-axis: b=K*L
(m). Thereinto: “C” is a long axis coefficient of Ship Domain, and; “K” is a short
axis coefficient of Ship Domain.

The value of a and b is related to the ship’s speed, draft, load capacity and local
visibility, area, weather. The variation coefficients are assumed to be: speed
coefficient (fS), draft coefficient (fD ), load capacity coefficient (fL), visibility
coefficient (fV)、area coefficient (fA)、weather coefficient (fW ). So:
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a=C*fS* fD * fL *fV*fA* fW *L (m)；
b=K*fS* fD * fL *fV*fA* fW *L (m).

The values of all coefficients are obtained by observation, statistical analysis,
experiment and judgment of experts. The following Table 5.2 is introduced by the
experts from Qingdao port, it is only for reference.
Table 5.2- Scopes of coefficient value in Qingdao port
Coefficients

C

K

fS

Scope

Value

Note

2-4

Experimental data, according to
port condition. In general, a port,
with
good
navigational
infrastructures, should choose a
relatively small value.

/

1-3

Experimental data, according to
port condition. In general, a port,
with
good
navigational
infrastructures, should choose a
relatively small value.

Speed（kn）<5

0.5

5≤ Speed（kn）<6

0.6

6≤ Speed（kn）<7

0.7

7≤ Speed（kn）<8

0.8

8≤ Speed（kn）<9

0.9

9≤ Speed（kn）<10

1

10≤ Speed（kn）<11

1.1

11≤ Speed（kn）<12

1.2

12≤ Speed（kn）<13

1.3

13≤ Speed（kn）<14

1.4

14≤ Speed（kn）<15

1.5

15≤ Speed（kn）<16

1.6

16≤ Speed（kn）<17

1.7

17≤ Speed（kn）<18

1.8

18≤ Speed（kn）<19

1.9

19≤ Speed（kn）<20
20≤ Speed（kn）
在此处键入公式。

2.0

/

2.1
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experimental data

fD

Draft (m) <10

1

10≤ Draft (m) <12.5

1.1

12.5≤ Draft (m) <15

1.2

15≤ Draft (m) <17.5

1.3

17.5≤ Draft (m) <20

1.4

20≤ Draft (m)

1.5

Load capacity (m ) <
200,000
3
Load capacity (m ) ≥
200,000
1.5< Visibility (nm)

experimental data

3

fL

fV

fA

1
1.5

Q-Flex & Q-Max LNG carriers
should be 2.

1

1.2< Visibility (nm) ≤1.5

1.1

0.9< Visibility (nm) ≤1.2

1.2

0.6< Visibility (nm) ≤0.9

1.3

0.3< Visibility (nm) ≤0.6

1.4

0< Visibility (nm) ≤0.3

1.5

Near berth

0.5

Vicinity of turning point

0.8

Channel

1

General weather

1

Severe weather

2

fW

experimental data

For other areas, select according
to the water area of navigational
availability.
Severe weather is defined as:
Wind speed ≥ 14 m/s (Moderate
gale and above), or wave heigh
≥ 2m, whichever is greater.

To determine the scope of Ship Domain (Moving Safety Zone) of a LNG carrier,
firstly, the values of all coefficients should be chose according to the actual condition
of local port, and then to obtain the length of a and b through the calculations.
Secondly, the area of the ellipse can be obtained by the formula “ S = πab”. Finally,
the coordinates of focus points F1 , F2 and the arbitrary point M could be obtained,
and the boundary of Ship Domain is determined.
5.1.6

Example verification

Taking the port of Qingdao as an example, as the top 10 ports in the world, there are
around 120 merchant ships navigating in the water area every day, including LNG
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carriers. assuming that a full loaded Q-Max type LNG carrier with a loading capacity
of 260,000 m3 is navigating in the port, the ship length overall is 300m, the breadth is
50m, the draft of the ship is 15m, fairway speed 12kn and slowdown to 6kn before
berthing, visibility is good, normal weather conditions. The scopes of its ship domain
in the fairway and arriving berth are calculated by the formulas in 5.1.5 and shown in
Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Dimensions of ship domain for Q-Max LNG carrier in Qingdao port
Position

a (m)

b (m)

area (km2 )

In channel

1521

761

3.6

Arriving berth

819

410

1.1

As can be seen in table 5.3, the distance from the ship’s head to the forward
boundary of Moving Safety Zone is “ a − L/2 = 1371m ≈ 0.74nm”, the same as
the aft; the distance from each ship’s side to the abeam boundary of Moving Safety
Zone is “b − B/2 = 736m ≈ 0.4nm”. This scope is similar to the requirements in
Shenzhen port and Taiwan port as shown in table 5.1. Therefore the calculation
method is practicable.
5.2

Leaking Hazard Zone
5.2.1

Definition

The Leaking Hazard Zone is the area where may be threatened by LNG pool fire if
LNG leakage occurred from a LNG carrier. When the LNG carrier accident is in the
unknown stage, or has clearly identified LNG leakage, in order to protect the safety
of life and property around the LNG carrier, the Leaking Hazard Zone should be
established around the LNG carrier to isolate the ship in distress and other ships and
personnel.
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5.2.2

Scope

According to the report of Sandia National Labs issued in 2004 “Guidance on Risk
Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over
Water”, the Leaking Hazard Zone of a LNG carrier may be determined by the heat
flux in the unit area (Hightower, 2004, p.74). The hazard area is divided into 3 zones
according to the heat flux and damage (see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: The classification of hazard zones by LNG fire heat flux
Hazard
zones

Heat flux
(kw/m2 )

Zone 1

≥ 37.5

Zone 2

37.5--5

Zone 3

≤ 5

Damage
Thermal radiation could pose a severe
public safety and property hazard
Thermal radiation transitions to less severe
hazard levels to public safety and property
Thermal radiation poses lesser risks to public
safety and property

Source: Hightower, M., et al. (2004). Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large
Liquefied Natural (LNG) Spill Over Water (Sandia National Laboratories) . Retrieved June 7, 2017
from the World Wide Web: http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2004/046258.pdf

The scope of the 3 types of hazard zones is related to the quantity of LNG leakage.
According to the Sandia National Labs research, in normal circumstances, for
accidental LNG s pills, the damage hole of the cargo containment system would be
in the range of 0.5-1.5m2 , the range of Zone 1 is about 250m around the ship; Zone 2
is in the range of 250-750m around the ship and Zone 3 is around the ship more than
750m. For a large number of intentional LNG spills (e.g. terrorist attack), the
damage hole of the cargo containment system would be in the range of 5-7m2 , and
Zone 1 is about 500m around the ship; Zone 2 is in the range of about 500-1600m,
Zone 3 is around the ship more than 1600m. (Hightower, 2004, p.74)
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5.3

Escort operation

In order to ensure the safety of LNG carriers, the escort tugs shall, during the course
of the inbound and outbound navigation of LNG carrier, be arranged at the boundary
of the Moving Safety Zone to warn the other ships.
(1) Escort tugs should maintain a good navigation order in the fairway and control
the traffic flow in vicinity of the LNG carrier to ensure the clear of fairway;
(2) Escort tugs should label the boundary of the Moving Safety Zone of the LNG
carrier in her RADAR or ECDIS, other ships are prohibited from entering into;
(3) In the vicinity of the island and the high density traffic area, the escort tugs
should evacuate the ships near the area in advance to ensure the clear of fairway for
the navigational safety of the LNG carrier;
(4) When the maneuverability of LNG carrier is restricted in port, the escort tugs
should assist her to maneuver;
(5) In the process of escort, the escort tugs should take emergency response to deal
with any emergency.
5.4

Communication mechanism

To ensure the safety of LNG carriers and smooth the escort operations, the various
organizations involved in escorting should establish a good communication
mechanism to ensure real-time, barrier-free communication.
(1) The port VTS center shall choose a radio dedicated channel which could
communicate with the escort agency and boats, LNG terminal, LNG carrier and her
pilot.
(2) Before the LNG carrier enters or leaves the port, the LNG carrier should report to
the port VTS center and confirms the navigation plan. The escort agency shall
organize the escort fleet and personnel to reach the starting point 30 minutes before
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the LNG carrier’s arriving to clear the fairway.
(3) If the other ships do not follow the orders issued by escort tugs, the escort tugs
should call VTS center for assistance.
(4) The navigational warning regarding escort operation should be broadcasted to
other ships a few hours before, which would leave enough time for them to prepare
for the situation.
5.5

Escort tugs and personnel
5.5.1

Power of escort tugs

During the escort process, the LNG carrier's engine failure should be taken into
account. The escort tugs should have the ability to provide sufficient support to
ensure the effective control of the LNG carrier when it is out of control.

According to the requirements in Chinese “Design Code of General Layout for Sea
Ports 2013”, the necessary power of tugs to assist the ship maneuvering is calculated
by the following formula.
BHP = KQ
Thereinto: BHP is the abbreviation of Break Horse Power (KW); K is a coefficient,
when ship’s DWT>50000t，K=0.08; Q is DWT (t).

For example ： a Q-Flex type LNG carrier (217,000m3 ), DWT is 121945.8t:
BHP=0.08×121945.8=9755.7（kW）≈13267.7 horse power; a Q-Max type LNG
carrier (266,000m3 ), DWT is 163922t: BHP=0.08×163922=13113.8（kW）≈17834.7
horse power. The calculation is based on the condition of no wind and current, if in
the condition of strong wind and current, the power or the number of tugs should be
increased accordingly.
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5.5.2

Standards of escort tugs

(1) Speed. The speed of escort tugs should not be less than the speed of LNG carriers
(rang from 8-12kn), therefore, the maximum speed of escort tugs should not be less
than 12kn;
(2) Navigational equipment: the Moving Safety Zone and the Leaking Hazard Zone
should be labeled on the radar or ECDIS of escort tugs, so the navigational
equipment has to be functional;
(3) Fire- fighting. In case of LNG leakage emergency, one of the escort tugs should
have the ability to fight the fire; and all the tugs should equip the funnel with fire
dampers.
5.5.3

Personnel

Escort command personnel should be qualified and familiar with the escorting waters
environment, familiar with the "International Regulations for the Preventing
Collisions at Sea 1972", familiar with the properties of LNG and the specialties of
LNG carrier, while he or she should have the good communication and coordination
capabilities, good English. Meanwhile he or she should have the ability to identify
the risks and hazards in the process of escorting and can take appropriate measures to
control them.
5.6

Escort plan

The escort vessel shall be capable of marking the Moving Safety Zone and the
Leaking Hazard Zone of the LNG carrier. The boundaries of the two zones are set in
accordance with the standards of 5.1.5 and 5.2.2 of this chapter respectively.
According to the scope of Moving Safety Zone and the requirements of the escort
tugs power, this paper proposes two escort plan (Fig. 5.4) from different sea
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conditions. The plan A is prepared for a better sea condition and the plan B is
prepared for a harsh sea conditions.
(1) Plan A: 3 escort tugs needed, one is for the guide, and the other two are for the
maneuver. One of which is a fire- fighting tug. In the process of escorting, the tugs
should be positioned at the boundary of the Moving Safety Zone. With the gradual
reduction of LNG carrier speed, the range of Moving Safety Zone should be reduced
accordingly.
(2) Plan B: 4 escort tugs needed for harsh sea condition in case of emergency. Others
are the same with Plan A.

Figure 5.4: Sketch map of escort tugs or boats positioning

5.7

Escort supports

(1) The local rules or regulations should be established by port authority or maritime
administration to normalize the escort operation.
(2) The escort agency shall have the qualification of escort, its qualification and
ability should be recognized by port authority or maritime administration.
(3) An integrated emergency response plan should be established by all agencies
involving in escort operation. And port authority or maritime administration should
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designate a person to maintain and improve it. The content of the emergency
response plan should at least include the disposal procedure of LNG leakage and
pool fire, the emergency evacuation plan, the responsibility of each agency, etc.
(4) An LNG related experts group should be established and maintained to ensure to
receive proper and correct expertise in the event of emergency.
5.8

Chapter summary

In this chapter, to minimize the probability and consequence of the collision
accidents involving LNG carrier and other merchant ship in port, the author mainly
studies the establishment of LNG carrier Moving Safety Zone and Leaking Hazard
Zone. The model of Fujii Ship Domain is adopted as the mathematical model of
Moving Safety Zone, and a method for calculating the scope is proposed. And then
take the Qingdao port as an example to verify the reliability of the calculation model.
Meanwhile, use the LNG pool fire test results of the United States Sandia National
Labs to set up LNG carrier Leaking Hazard Zone. And some requirements, standards
and supports for escort operation, communication mechanism, escort tugs and
personnel and two escort plans are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and prospect
In this research paper, the properties of LNG and the specialties of LNG carrier are
firstly introduced. Then, the data of 170 LNG carrier accidents collected from 1964
to 2017 are analyzed, and the conclusion of most accidents happened in port is drawn.
Simultaneously, the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is carried out to analyze the
navigational risks of LNG carriers and to prove the conclusion. Furthermore, it is
concluded that the risk of collision between LNG carriers and merchant ships is a
medium risk and should be controlled. It is decided to reduce the probability of
collision by establishing a Moving Safety Zone around LNG carriers, and to mitigate
the severity of consequences of the accident by setting the Leakage Hazard Zone,
and to protect the two zones by means of tugs or boast escort. Through the studies on
the theory of Ship Domain and the empirical coefficient, the mathematical model of
Moving Safety Zone is introduced, by which the scope of Moving Safety Zone can
be quantitatively calculated and obtained. On the other hand, the pool fire
experimental results of Sandia National Labs are used to classify 3 categories of
Leaking Hazard Zones of LNG carrier. Finally, the general standards, requirements,
plans and supports for tugs or boats escort are recommended to enhance the
practicality of this paper.
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All in all, the conclusions of this research paper are as follows:
(1) The LNG carriers face with the most of safety risks while navigating in port and
through the Formal Safety Assessment the risk of collision with other merchant ship
is determined as a medium risk which should be controlled.
(2) Propose the methods to control the collision risk. One of them is to isolate the
LNG carrier from other ships through establishing a Moving Safety Zone, which can
reduce the probability of the accident. And another one is to setting a Leaking Hazard
Zone to reduce the severity of consequence of the accident. The two zones should be
protected and maintained by escort tugs or boats.
(3) Put forward a mathematical model of Moving Safety Zone according to the
theory of Ship Domain, and calculate the scope by setting empirical coefficients;
using the LNG pool fire test results of the United States Sandia National Labs to set
up 3 categories Leaking Hazard Zone.
(4) Recommend two escort plans according to the sea condition, and discuss the
standards of escort operation, communication mechanism, escort supports, escort
tugs and personnel.

With the continuous adjustment of the global energy structure, the share of Liquefied
Natural Gas is increasing; the global LNG shipping industry will maintain a strong
momentum in the next few decades. The study on the safety of LNG carrier
transportation,

including safety escort,

would draw more attentions. The

development of ship technology will be moving towards a more intelligent and more
economical direction, there is no exception to LNG carriers, and more likely in the
leading position. Imagine that when an unmanned, LNG-powered LNG carrier
navigates in the port water area, how to ensure her safety and the safety of port. On
the other hand, the study on the Moving Safety Zone needs to be further discussed,
and this kind of study may be a functional technology in the field of unmanned ship.
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Set the ship's Moving Safety Zone as if equip the ship with a safety cover, excluding
the human factors, the intelligent computers will protect this cover by accurate
calculation and auto-command the ship, almost all ship accidents can be avoided..
Finally, regarding the serious situation of global anti-terrorism, ship’s navigational
safety can no longer be treated with the traditional way; many extreme situations
need to be taken into account. In 2016, a Teekay's LNG carrier "Galicia Spirit" was
attacked by armed terrorists using Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). Fortunately, the
ship was not seriously damaged, but it also sounded the alarm for us. Whether the
future LNG carrier escort need to join the anti-terrorism considerations, which is a
question worthy of our thought.
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APPENDIX
Historic LNG carrier accidents with and without spillage of cargo （2006-2017）
The follo wing table contains a list of known past incidents involving LNG carriers. Both minor incidents and serious accidents are included, but incidents
involving small LNG carriers, i.e. less than 6,000 GRT are left out. The source of info rmation for the various incidents is g iven in the right most column. The
shaded rows correspond to incidents that are considered out of scope. The incidents are categorized according to the following crude accident categories:
• Collision: Col
• Grounding: Grd
• Contact: Cnt
• Fire or explosion: FE
• Equipment or machinery: EM
• Heavy Weather: HW
• Loading/Unloading: L/U
• Cargo containment system: CCS

#

Yea

Ship

Type of

r

name

Activity

Injuries

LN

Inciden

Incident description

Cargo

/fatalitie

G

t

barrier.

(Year

containme

s

spill

categor

built)

nt

Source

y

Membrane
- Spherical
- Other
1.

200

Golar

Spherical

Unloading

No

No

L/U
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On 14 March 2006, LNG carrier Go lar Freeze was

IMO

6

Freeze

alongside and discharging her cargo at Savannah USA.

(b. 1977)

An inbound tanker passed astern in speed excess of 14
knots. The close proximity caused the discharging vessel
to vibrate. Cargo operation stopped. The accident resulted
in both gangways being destroyed but there was no other
damage and no injuries.
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Browse.aspx?Form=Annex1&Action=View&IncidentID=5741&AnnexID=6495

2.

200

Ibra

7

LNG

Membrane

1

on

electricia

on her way to Qalat LNG Terminal. It was founded that

n died

the electrician was traoed in the elevator shaft. Rescue

(b. 2006)

No

EM

On 3rd February 2007, the LNG tanker "IBRA LNG" was

Transportati

IMO

operation carried out, but unfortunately he finally lost his
life.
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Browse.aspx?Form=Annex1&Action=View&IncidentID=6363&AnnexID=8154

3.

200

Matthew

9

(b. 1979)

Membrane

Transportati

No

No

Grd

on

On December 15, 2009, the liquid natural gas carrier

NOAA

Matthew grounded on coral reef habitat off the south
coast of Puerto Rico near Guayanilla. The vessel was
eventually freed fro m the reef with the assistance of local
tug boats.
https://darrp.noaa.gov/ship-groundings/lng-carrier-matthew

4.

201

Bluesky

0

(b. 2006)

Membrane

Unloading

No

No

EM

Bluesky, the TMT-controlled carrier was damaged at
GDF Suez’s Montoir de Bretagne terminal in France
when a valve was by-passed and liquid passed into the
gas take-off line during discharge operations. The damage
sustained extended to part of the ship’s manifo ld and its
feed lines without damage to the shore-side systems. No
LNG release was reported.
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http://www.ch-iv.com/as s ets /documents /Safety%20His tory%20of%20International%20LNG%20Operations .pdf?/pdfs /Safety%20His tory%20of%20International%20LNG%20Operations .pdf

5.

201

LNG

Spherical

loading

No

No

L/U

During loading operations at the Bonny LNG terminal in

0

Edo

Nigeria, LNG Edo took a significant list. The cause of the

(b. 1980)

list was found to be abnormal ballast water d istribution in

CH·IV

the ship’s tanks. The distribution in the ballast tanks was
returned to normal and loading was co mpleted. There
were no injuries and any pollution or damage.
http://www.ch-iv.com/as s ets /documents /Safety%20His tory%20of%20International%20LNG%20Operations .pdf?/pdfs /Safety%20His tory%20of%20International%20LNG%20Operations .pdf

6.

201

Excelerat

Membrane

Unloading

No

Yes

EM

On 1 March 2011, at port of Milfo rd haven, leakage of

1

e

LNG during a discharging operation due to a defective

(b. 2006)

thermo-well, resulting in a crack to the main deck.

IMO

https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Browse.aspx?Form=Annex1&Action=View&IncidentID=8304&AnnexID=11475

7.

201

LNG

1

River

Membrane

Transportati

1 officer

on

died

No

EM

On the 13th September 2011, the LNG Carrier “LNG

IMO

River Orashi” was on its way through the South Atlantic

Orashi

to Korea. When the Chief Officer, Cargo Engineer and

(b. 2004)

Bosun inspected the ballast tanks as part of routine
planned maintenance. The Chief Officer descended to the
bottom of the tank.
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Browse.aspx?Form=Annex1&Action=View&IncidentID=8520&AnnexID=14738

8.

201

Al

3

Gharrafa

Membrane

Transportati

No

No

Col

on

While transiting the Singapore Strait en route to Japan,
the Qatari-chartered Al Gharaffa collided with the Greek

(b. 2008)

Controlled, 10,114-teu Hanjin Italy. The LNG Carrier
suffered severe bow damage, however there were no
injuries, no damage to the containment system, and no
LNG was released.
http://www.ch-iv.com/as s ets /documents /Safety%20His tory%20of%20International%20LNG%20Operations .pdf?/pdfs /Safety%20His tory%20of%20International%20LNG%20Operations .pdf
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9.

201

Navigato

4

r Scorpio

Membrane

Transportati

No

No

Grd

on

At 1521 on 3 January 2014 the Liberia registered

MAIB

liquefied gas carrier, Nav igator Scorpio, ran aground on

(b. 2009)

Haisborough Sand in the North Sea. The vessel was
undamaged by the grounding and there were no injuries
or pollution; 2.5 hours later, it refloated on the rising tide.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/547c6f1740f0b6024100000d/NavigatorScorpio.pdf

10

201

Zarga

.

5

(b. 2009)

Membrane

Tied up at

1 officer

jetty

injured

No

EM

On 2 March 2015, a deck officer on board the LNG

MAIB

carrier, Zarga, suffered severe head injuries when he was
struck by a mooring rope that had parted while
repositioning the vessel at the South Hook LNG terminal,
Milford Haven.
http://www.safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/UK-MAIB-Safety-Bulletin-01-16-Zara-mooring-accident2016_01.pdf

11

201

Lijmiliya

.

6

(b. 2009)

Membrane

Tied up at

No

No

Col

jetty

The UK’s Port of M ilford Haven confirmed that in the

Port

early hours of Sunday morning July 10th, an incident

Milford

occurred when its pilot vessel St Davids made hard

Haven

of

contact with LNG carrier Lijmiliya during a routine
transfer of pilot operation.
http://www.safety4sea.com/pilot-vessel-hits-lng-carrier-at-uk-port/

12

201

Galicia

.

6

Spirit

Membrane

Transportati

No

No

/

on

(b. 2004)

The Teekay LNG carrier Galicia Sp irit was attacked by

Reuters/

RPG fire on 8 nautical miles off Perim Island, Yemen.

Safety4se

Heavy armed men in a skiff approached the vessel fro m

a

the Yemen coast and fired an rocket p ropelled grenade
(RPG) over the large gas carrier. Fortunately, the vessel
was not seriously damaged and the fire did not caused
explosion. Also there were no injured people on board.
62

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-shipping-attack-idUKKCN12Q1UD

13

201

Al

.

7

Khattiya

Membrane

Anchored at

No

No

Col

anchorage

(b. 2009)

On 23 February 2017, while the 315m-long Al Khattiya

LNG

was at anchor at Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. It

World

was hit by Suezmax crude carrier Jag Laadki, There have

News

been no injuries or reports of pollution. Two of Al
Khattiya’s ballast tanks were breached with a loss of
some ballast water.
http://www.lngworldnews.com/oil-tanker-hits-q-flex-lng-carrier-al-khattiya-off-fujairah/
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